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Abstract
Alliances between competitors in which established firms provide access to proprietary
resources—for example, their distribution channels—are important business practices. We
analyze a market where an established firm, firm A, produces a product of well-known quality,
and a firm with an unknown brand, firm B, has to choose to produce high or low quality. Firm
A observes firm B’s quality choice but consumers do not. Hence, firm B is subject to a moral
hazard problem which can potentially be solved by firm A. Firm A can accept or reject to
form an alliance with firm B, which is observed by consumers. If an alliance is formed, firm
A implicitly certifies the rival’s product. Consumers infer that firm B is a competitor with
high quality, because otherwise why would the established firm accept to form an alliance?
The mechanism we discover allows for an economic interpretation of several types of business
practices. (JEL: L15, L13, L24, L42, M21, M31, D43)
1. Introduction
Firms entering a market often face an information disadvantage against estab-
lished rivals. This implies high costs and time needed to convey information
to consumers about their products—in particular, their product quality. Because
newcomers represent a threat to the profitability of established firms, it should
be surprising that the latter provide any form of cooperation or entry assistance
to the rivals. In particular, one would expect incumbents to avoid lending their
reputation to newcomers by forming alliances with them. However, the business
literature and the press provide extensive evidence that this is not the case. In
particular, alliances between competitors are documented in the pharmaceutical
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and automobile industry.1 Another example concerns the telecommunications
equipment industry. As has been reported by Carlin et al. (1994, p. 10) “a small
telecommunications equipment supplier was willing to become a key supplier to a
large leading switch manufacturer even though they competed in certain markets.
The larger company, recognized as a global leader in new technology, enhanced
the reputation of the smaller company.”2 This example suggests that competing
firms enter into an alliance with the purpose that one firm rents the reputation
from the other.
Although the explanations of cooperative practices between competitors can
be multiple, we here focus on their implications for information transmission.
We show that, because established firms share their reputation with high-quality
newcomers, alliances may solve the asymmetric information problem faced by
newcomers.3 We limit the scope of our analysis to strategies that the established
firms can implement through (legal) arrangements with other parties. Our lead
example is that of marketing alliances between competitors, where the established
firm provides market access for the entrant’s product. This may include access
to the distribution network of the established firm or the provision of after-sales
services by the established firm. The established firm may even sell the product
under its own brand (or a co-branding strategy may be agreed upon). In this paper,
we formalize the notion that an alliance between competitors may provide the
means for an unknown brand to overcome its information disadvantage vis à vis
the established firm. The key result is that the established firm has an incentive
to accept an entrant if it is of high quality and to reject if it is of low quality.
More precisely, we consider a market environment in which the information
that the established firm A possesses about the unknown brand of firm B is
also relevant to consumers. In particular, we take product quality as the relevant
variable: The quality of a firm’s product is indeed often only imperfectly known to
consumers.4 For instance, think of entrants as firms entering certain countries as in
the previous examples. We may therefore refer to firm B as the entrant, and to firm
1. The evidence concerning alliances between competitors is discussed in Section 4. There we also
present examples from those two industries.
2. The identity of the firms involved is confidential (Michael Dowling, personal communication,
March 31, 2006).
3. Our analysis can be seen as a particular case of coopetition within an industry, for a management
perspective on coopetition see Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). In our model coopetition takes
the following form: An entrant’s product is introduced into the market by the incumbent although it
competes with the incumbent’s product.
4. The assumption that an entrant’s quality may not be known to consumers is not new (see Farrell
1986) and seems natural for many markets. The assumption that the incumbent is perfectly informed
about the competitor’s quality while consumers are not is certainly admissible for a wide range of
cases. It is indeed true for many markets that the single consumer should afford a disproportionately
high cost to gain information about the entrant; these costs may be relatively low for firms in the
business, thanks to their scale, their knowledge of the technology, or to the network of experts to
which they have access.
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A as the incumbent, without by this confining ourselves to the framework of an
entry model. Firm B is assumed to be subject to moral hazard because it chooses
its product quality without the consumers observing it. Clearly, a firm with an
unknown brand may be able to transmit credible information independently, thus
revealing its quality or reliability. To do so, it must pay a cost, either through costly
certification, or through other costly actions such as warranties or advertising—in
the remainder we refer this cost as the certification cost. The two features, that
revelation is possible for a high-quality firm B, and that it is necessarily costly, are
both essential to our arguments. First, given entry, revelation must be affordable.
Otherwise, the moral hazard problem would definitely trap firm B. Indeed, firm
A would always exclude a high-quality firm B, and given entry, firm B would
always choose low quality. Secondly, revelation (that is, certification) by firm B
must be costly. If it were not, the moral hazard problem would be trivially solved
through certification and firm B could always produce high quality when this is
profitable. With costly revelation, furthermore, the costs may make it impossible
to make positive profit with a certified high quality, to the effect that firm B has
to stay out.
Now, suppose that a high-quality firm B, after having sunk its entry costs, can
make positive profits (net of certification costs). Then for the established firm the
“reject” strategy against a high-quality rival has no foreclosing power, because the
latter will be able to resist through certification and survive competition, that is
a high-quality firm B would certify if rejected. By contrast, a low-quality firm B
can never certify to be high quality. Therefore, firm A’s best response to firm B’s
action to enter with high quality is “accept” (if it receives a payment from firm
B). But then the reaction by firm A represents good news to consumers about
the quality of firm B: By the self-interested act of not fighting, firm A will signal
the good quality of firm B. The resulting equilibrium outcome is very different
from the outcome if alliances are forbidden. In this situation, firm B never enters
with high quality and may even stay out of the market. By contrast, as previously
argued, staying in the market and producing high quality is a profitable strategy
for firm B if alliances are allowed.
Our result relies on the incentives of firm A to respond differently to high
than to low quality because it achieves a competitive advantage when unmasking
a competitor to be of low quality. In this paper we formalize this competition
story, which is novel and relies critically on the fact that incumbent and entrant
are competitors in the market. In this setup, accepting to form an alliance can
reveal information although the incumbent’s reputation is immune to its actions.
Hence, we consider a market in which the quality of firmA is known with certainty
and cannot be subject to downgrading. We do not model how an incumbent firm
builds up reputation and simply assume that it has perfectly revealed quality (e.g.,
by certifying it). Still, firm A is not indifferent to the rival’s reputation because a
higher reputation of the rival reduces firm A’s market power.
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An alternative mechanism is that the established firm’s reputation may suffer
when selling jointly with an entrant of low quality—we call this the reputation
story. As to the reputation story, that a firm’s reputation may suffer, it has been
noted that the possibility to exclude competitors from a distribution channel pro-
vides a mean to protect the manufacturer’s brand image or quality recognition
from free-riding by other firms (see Bork 1978).5 This kind of argument could
be extended by stating that a refusal to associate the well-known firm’s brand
image to that of a competitor is a way to protect the value of past investments
in reputation. Although related to our ideas, this argument does not apply to
our model.6 The reputation mechanism is certainly of interest, but it is perhaps
not so surprising, given the insights in the literature. Furthermore, a mechanism
which does not rely on the incumbent’s reputation being at stake provides a
strong justification for the role of alliances to transmit information. From an
antitrust perspective alliances between competitors are often regarded with sus-
picion. Therefore, an analysis of their competitive effects seems to be of particular
importance.
Close to the present paper is our earlier work, Garella and Peitz (2000), about
the signaling role of shared intermediation in a specific retailing environment. In
that paper, we have analyzed a symmetric duopoly environment without entry
decisions (ignoring the issue of the legality status of alliances), where shared
retailing channels merely replace costly certification as a was to convey infor-
mation to consumers. In the present paper we explore asymmetric environments:
An established firm is an external provider of information to consumers about
the quality of a rival. Here, the legality of certain actions is shown to have conse-
quences on the amount of information conveyed to consumers and on the degree
of competitiveness of the market. Therefore, the results in the present paper are
much stronger than in our earlier paper: We show that the formation of alliances
affects entry decisions and the decision which quality to provide.7
In Section 2, we present the model with potential entry and show the main
results under moral hazard. We find that alliances between competitors can lead to
entry with high quality, which would not occur if such alliances were not allowed.8
In Section 3 we sketch some extensions. We show that our results hold as well
5. This idea has been discussed in various places in the antitrust literature (e.g., Ornstein 1989).
6. Related to the reputation story, some recent work studies the possibility of brand signaling in
the case of vertically related firms (see Chu and Chu 1994; Biglaiser and Friedman 1994, 1999).
Similar to the signaling mechanism presented there, one could make the argument that an incumbent
lends its reputation to another high-quality firm. Signaling by the incumbent firm then works because
consumers are able to evaluate its reputation loss that it would incur in case of cheating.
7. Also, our current results carry over to adverse selection environments (see the Discussion
section), whereas the results obtained in Garella and Peitz (2000) do not hold in such environments.
8. We also present equilibrium selection arguments invoking stability, as defined by Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986), to give the unique prediction that alliances are a signal of the entrant’s product
quality.
Garella and Peitz Alliances between Competitors 827
under adverse selection, where exclusion is enforced if Nature has selected the
bad quality product for the entrant. We also argue that in an extended model with
moral hazard and adverse selection the incumbent rejects to form an alliance with
positive probability along the equilibrium path. In Section 4, we provide some
examples and empirical evidence on alliances between competitors. We also dis-
cuss the usefulness of the results for the interpretation of other practices such as
the use of common retail services (and in particular the allocation of physical
space in superstores or shopping malls), white labels, licensing standards, and
exclusionary practices, including membership refusal by professional associa-
tions. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix provides details on the existence and
nature of mixed strategy equilibria and contains the proof of the proposition on
equilibrium selection.
2. Formal Analysis
2.1. A Moral Hazard Problem
Two competing firms A and B share firm A’s distribution (or promotion) channel
if they form an alliance. Otherwise, firm B has to build up its own channel. To
focus on the asymmetric information aspect, suppose that firm B does not have a
cost disadvantage in building its own distribution channel. However, consumers
observe whether firm B sells through firm A’s or its own distribution channel.
For its services firm A receives a fixed net payment of f .9 Without affecting the
formal analysis, firm A alternatively provides after-sales services to customers
of firm B and this is recognized by all consumers before purchase or, as another
alternative, the product of firm B is sold under the brand name of firm A.
We analyze a game played by the incumbent firm A, the entrant firm B, and
by consumers.10 Firms may or may not be allowed to form an alliance. At stage 1,
firm B has to pay an entry cost e when choosing the product design. Alternatively,
without any consequence upon the analysis, firm B may be a firm that has already
been active in the market and has to decide whether to exit the market or stay
with high or low quality;11 if it exits at this point it avoids the fixed cost e. For
9. In several real-world examples we observe that the established firm does not receive a fixed
payment but takes a share in the joint venture. This can be explained by a moral hazard problem
within the joint venture where the established firm has to exert some effort which is non-contractible.
However, in this paper we abstract from asymmetric information problems within an alliance and
can therefore restrict the analysis to fixed payments.
10. To easily distinguish between the two firms, in this section we refer to the incumbent as “he”
and the (potential) entrant as “she”.
11. If this firm has to maintain its previous quality then consumers must not have learned the quality
from past purchases. Alternatively, one can think of firm B replacing an outdated product.
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simplicity, we assume that the sunk cost e is independent of the product quality.
Firm A has already sunk this cost and is known to be of high quality.12
At stage 2, firm B may ask to form an alliance with firm A, in which case firm
A can accept or reject. Firm A receives a net payment of f . At stage 3, firm B
can certify high quality. We do not include the incentive problem of the certifying
authority to tell the truth (see Biglaiser 1993) but simply assume that firm B can
reveal her high quality to consumers, albeit at a cost g.13 Firm B can also exit the
market at this point (it is never in the interest of firm A to do so). Therefore, the
interim participation constraint of firm B must be satisfied at this stage. At stage 4
firms set prices and at stage 5 consumers form beliefs and make their purchasing
decision. The game can be described as follows:
Stage 1: In-out decision and quality choice. The entrant decides whether to:
a) pay the sunk cost e and produce high quality, b) pay sunk the cost e and
produce low quality, or c) stay out of the market—thereby ending the game with
zero payoff. The chosen quality qB ∈ {H,L} is common knowledge between
incumbent and entrant but is not observed by consumers.
Stage 2: Distribution channel. Firm B decides whether to ask to form an
alliance, and then firm A agrees or rejects the offer. If they form an alliance
the incumbent receives a net payment of f .
Stage 3: Certification decision. Firm B decides whether or not to certify her
product quality and in case of certification she incurs costs g. She can also exit
at this stage.
Stage 4: Price setting. Firms set prices (or quantities) for their products
simultaneously. The cost difference between the production of high and low
quality is denoted by h.
Stage 5: Consumer choice. Consumers observe the number of products, the
prices of each product in the market, whether or not a distribution channel is
shared, and any certification. They use this information to form their beliefs on
the product quality of the entrant. Based on their beliefs they make their purchasing
decision.
At a later point in the analysis, we will allow the entrant to randomize between
qualities at stage 1 and the incumbent can reject the request to form an alliance
with any probability at stage 2. We do not formally introduce the possibility of
random certification but our qualitative results will remain unaffected. Stage 4 is
black-boxed in the profit functions because equilibrium prices depend only upon
12. If e constitutes a fixed cost which has to be paid by firm B when initially active, then also firm
A incurs this cost. Because firm A is always active in our model, our analysis carries over to this
alternative interpretation of e, provided that firm A still makes positive net profits.
13. Certification can not only be interpreted as certification by an outside auditor (see Biglaiser
1993) but also as warranties provided by the entrant or the entrant’s advertising.
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whether or not entry has occurred and upon the perceived quality of the entrant,
see below. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game.
If firm B’s product is available on the market, consumers have to form beliefs
based on the observation whether or not an alliance has been formed and whether
or not firmB has certified. Hence, consumers observe one of the following four sit-
uations: certification and alliance, denoted by (C, 2), no certification and alliance,
(N, 2), certification and no alliance, (C, 1), and no certification and no alliance,
(N, 1). For expositional convenience, suppose consumers believe that the brand
is of high quality with probability 1 or 0. Hence, beliefs of consumers are a map
from {C,N} times {1, 2} to {L,H } and we write, for example, b(C, 1) = H for
the belief that firm B produces high quality if she certifies and chooses separate
retailing. Because only a high-quality firm possibly certifies, consumers have
to believe that b(C, 1) = b(C, 2) = H . Beliefs b(N, 1) and b(N, 2) will be
determined as part of the equilibrium analysis.
We analyze this setup under a number of assumptions (or properties) that
profit functions have to satisfy. Note that, in general, the costs to provide a certain
quality can be thought of as fixed or variable. To keep the analysis as simple as
possible, we assume that product quality only affects the fixed costs of firm B
so that equilibrium prices only depend on perceived quality.14 This also implies
that, because of the incentives to mimic, firms cannot use prices to signal firm B’s
product quality.15 Without loss of generality we set the fixed cost of low quality
to 0 so that the cost difference between producing high and low quality, denoted
by h > 0, is the fixed cost of high quality.
The manufacturers’ profits gross of fixed costs depend only on the perceived
quality of the competitor, qeB , and we write πA(q
e
B) for the profits of the incumbent
and πB(qeB) for the profits of the entrant. The latter can choose low or high quality,
denoted byL andH , respectively, or stay out of the market altogether. If the entrant
does not enter the incumbent makes monopoly profits πMA with π
M
A > πA(q
e
B)
for any qeB .
Firms set prices (or quantities) noncooperatively. We do not impose a partic-
ular model of price or quantity competition, nor symmetry assumptions and only
make assumptions on reduced profit functions:
πA(L) > πA(H), (A.1)
πB(H) > πB(L). (A.2)
14. The cost could also be modeled as a sunk cost which the entrant incurs when she chooses
quality, which implies that firms do not have an incentive to downgrade high quality after entry
because it does not give a cost advantage. This alternative specification, which we do not adopt,
however, would lead to quality-dependent entry costs.
15. Price signaling is not possible in a one-shot oligopoly game in which quality differences only
affect fixed but not variable costs and in which all consumers are uninformed. In our equilibrium
qualities are separated through certification or alliance building. Because beliefs are constant in
prices, firms set full-information prices.
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Assumption (A.1) states that the incumbent enjoys higher profits under full
information when he competes against low quality. This means that he enjoys
more market power competing against low quality. Assumption (A.2) states that
under full information the entrant prefers to be of high quality, as a high-quality
firm can extend her demand and increase price-cost margins. Assumptions (A.1)
and (A.2) are met in many oligopoly models (Garella and Peitz (2000) provide
several examples).
When deciding whether to enter at stage 1, firm B has to respect her par-
ticipation constraints. Our next assumption states that under full information a
high-quality entrant makes positive profits:
πB(H) − e > 0. (A.3)
This implies that under full information entry will always occur. Clearly,
under Assumptions (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3), firm B enters with high quality at
stage 1. At a subgame perfect equilibrium, profits areπA(H) andπB(H)−e. Thus,
in such a setup, alliances do not play a role under full information; therefore, any
reason to form an alliance between competitors has been successfully excluded
from our model, provided full information prevails.
We consider markets in which the cost of certification, g, is as high as to deny
to firm B the possibility to enter with certifies high quality and make positive
profit:
πB(H) − e − g < 0. (A.4)
In other words, asymmetric information is a barrier to high-quality production
because firm B can only enter with low quality or stay out.
We first analyze the 5-stage game under the restriction that alliances between
competitors are forbidden by law and punished by antitrust authorities. The anal-
ysis is then straightforward. Firm B wants to be believed to be of high quality
because in this case she gains πB(H)− e compared to πB(L)− e − h. However,
absent certification she has an incentive to cheat and therefore high quality is not
sustainable. When certification is available, at stage 3 the high-quality entrant
has the mean of perfectly revealing her quality, albeit at a cost. According to
Assumption (A.4), the addition of this cost to the entry cost makes it unprofitable
to enter the market.
Note that Assumptions (A.3) and (A.4) combined read as 0 < πB(H)−e < g.
If certification was cheap enough so thatπB(H)−e−g ≥ 0, then the moral hazard
problem could be directly solved by the entrant. However, if certification is costly
so as to respect (A.4), then along the equilibrium path, the entrant will not enter
with high quality. Beliefs then must satisfy b(N, 1) = L. It is straightforward to
prove the following.
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Proposition 1. Suppose alliances between competitors are not allowed. In any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if πB(L) − e < 0 firm B stays out of the market,
whereas if πB(L) − e ≥ 0 she enters with low quality.
This proposition characterizes all PBE when alliances are not allowed. Infor-
mation to consumers can be provided only directly by firm B, but certifying high
quality leads to losses, when evaluated at stage 1. Therefore, firm B is trapped
in the moral hazard impasse. There is no reason for the entrant to choose high
quality.
2.2. The Signaling Role of Alliances
The present section shows how alliances between competitors may help to solve
the moral hazard problem. This holds if profit functions satisfy a number of addi-
tional properties. First, consider the incumbent’s profit. Note that the incumbent
might be induced to indiscriminately accept a low as well as a high-quality entrant
as a partner in alliance because he receives payment f . If that was the case, con-
sumers would not observe any discrimination against a low-quality entrant and
could not make any inference from the incumbent’s action. Therefore, let us
strengthen Assumption (A.1) to the following.
πA(L) > πA(H) + f. (A.1+)
This implies that the possible savings from sharing the fixed costs with the
entrant are lower than the gains from unmasking that the latter is of low quality.
For Assumption (A.1+) to be satisfied, both firms must be sufficiently close
competitors.
Second, consider the incentive for a high-quality entrant to be revealed as
such. We strengthen Assumption (A.2) to
πB(H) > πB(L) + max[0, g − h]. (A.2+)
Under this assumption the entrant of high quality has an incentive to reveal
her quality in spite of the certification costs. Allowing for meaningful certification
means that Assumption (A.2+) has to be satisfied, because otherwise certification
is never used by the entrant and the moral hazard problem would not be solved:
The entrant either enters with low quality or not at all. Note that g − h can be
negative, in this case Assumption (A.2+) is equivalent to Assumption (A.2).
Third, we also strengthen Assumption (A.3) to cover the entrant’s payment
to firm A in case of an alliance:
πB(H) − e − f > 0. (A.3+)
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Our last assumption concerns the credibility to use certification after a firm has
entered with high quality. Although entry without an alliance is not profitable (see
Assumption (A.4)) we assume that once the entry costs are sunk it is worthwhile
for a high-quality entrant not to leave the market.
πB(H) − g > 0. (A.5)
Hence, the participation constraint of a high-quality firm B is not binding in
the subgame starting at stage 3, independent of the previous action of firm A. If
Assumption (A.5) did not hold, then firm A would be enabled to reject an alliance
with a type H rival, induce exit, and remain a monopolist. Such rejection under
the reverse of Assumption (A.5) is profitable as πMA > πA(H) + f , which is
implied by Assumption (A.1+).
In our model we have taken the payment f to be exogenous. However, this
may be considered as ad hoc because it is subject to negotiations between the two
firms. Suppose the two firms engage in Nash bargaining at stage 3 so that each
firm obtains half of the surplus that is generated by the alliance. This surplus is
equal to g so that the incumbent receives a payment of f = g/2. Then if
πB(H) − e < g < min{πB(H), 2(πB(H) − e)}
holds, Assumptions (A.3+), (A.4), and (A.5) are satisfied.16
Consumer beliefs must take into account that exclusion is allowed. Here, we
again focus on PBE with beliefs which attach either probability 0 or probability
1 to H . Recall that b(C, ·) = H , that is, independent of the retailing structure
certification C perfectly reveals high quality. It remains to specify beliefs for
situations (N, 1) and (N, 2), where 1 stands for not forming an alliance and 2 for
forming an alliance.
Note that any belief system containing the belief that separate retailing is
associated with a high quality cannot be part of an equilibrium system of beliefs.
Under such a belief system, indeed, firm B would choose low quality at the first
stage and enjoy the revenues of a high-quality firm so that the beliefs are not
confirmed. It follows that all 0,1–beliefs necessarily entail b(N, 1) = L. The
complete belief system then is obtained by spelling out that either b(N, 2) = L
or b(N, 2) = H . Suppose that consumers form pessimistic beliefs, b(N, 2) = L
and consider the entrant’s profit within an alliance. Under pessimistic beliefs
and under the assumptions above, a high-quality entrant who does not certify
obtains profits under separate retailing πB(H) − e − f − g if she certifies and
πB(L) − e − f − h if she does not certify. When not forming an alliance we
have the same expressions except that the entrant does not make the payment f .
16. Assuming that the entrant’s operating profits (gross of certification costs and fixed payments)
πB(H) are (1+λ) times the entry cost, this inequality can be rewritten as λ < g/e < min{1+λ, 2λ}.
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Then, under this belief system, no saving on certification costs is possible and
entry of high quality does not occur. If πB(L)− e < 0 this belief system sustains
an equilibrium path at a PBE along which the incumbent remains a monopolist.
Otherwise, she enters with low quality and does not request to form an alliance.
Alternatively, consumers may form optimistic beliefs, b(N, 2) = H . Under
optimistic beliefs, an entrant who forms an alliance with the incumbent is believed
to be of high quality and the moral hazard problem can be solved. The incumbent’s
threat to reject to form an alliance with the entrant convinces consumers of the
entrant’s high quality.
Proposition 2. If alliances between competitors are allowed, there exists a
PBE where the entrant chooses high quality, enters, and forms an alliance with
the incumbent. This equilibrium entails the credible threat to reject to form an
alliance with a low-quality entrant. If alliances were not allowed high quality
could not be sustained in equilibrium.
Proof. Under optimistic beliefs, at stage 2, the entrant asks for an alliance because
this is a dominant strategy, whether her true quality be H or L. Indeed, if firm A
rejects, either type has a profit that is the same as when no alliance was proposed,
but if firm A accepts the profit will be higher for both types. For the low-quality
entrant the perceived quality is H instead of L. Rejection of high quality triggers
certification by the entrant because by certifying she obtains πB(H)−g instead of
π(L)−h (see Assumption (A.5)). Hence, she saves g − f if accepted. Rejecting
the request to form an alliance only gives πA(H) to the incumbent. By contrast,
if the incumbent accommodates the entrant and forms an alliance then he gets
πA(H) + f > πA(H). Then, to accommodate the entrant is the only strategy
that can be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the entrant chooses
H , given optimistic beliefs.
Also, one can check that the incumbent’s incentive constraint to reject access
by a low-quality entrant is πA(H)+ f < πA(L), which coincides with Assump-
tion (A.1+). Hence, out of the equilibrium path if the entrant is L, the incumbent
has an incentive to reject the request to form an alliance. Accordingly, consumers’
beliefs are confirmed at an equilibrium with optimistic beliefs and the entrant
chooses H . The statement concerning the case that alliances are not allowed
follows from Proposition 1.
The result implies that a prohibition of alliances between competitors under
moral hazard can only prevent the attainment of socially desirable outcomes.17
17. Our result focuses on entry and the solution to the moral hazard problem. Denoting by WM
social welfare under monopoly and by W(qB) welfare with entry of quality qB , entry with high
quality is unambiguously welfare-enhancing if W(H) > WM and W(H) > W(L). When phrasing
moral hazard as a problem from the social point of view, these inequalities are satisfied.
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To define bounds on entry costs such that the legality of alliances facilitates high-
quality entry, we define e′ ≡ πB(H) − g and e′′ ≡ πB(H) − f . Recall that
Assumptions (A.4) and (A.3+) imply g > f . Hence e′ < e′′. An entry cost
e ∈ (e′, e′′] blocks high-quality entry if alliances between competitors are not
allowed but entry with high quality takes place and the signaling mechanism
works if they are allowed.
2.3. Equilibrium Outcomes and Stability
For a complete characterization of all PBE of the game, we have to introduce
mixed strategies. We focus on the more interesting case where both πB(L)−e < 0
and πB(H) − e − g < 0, that is, on the case where neither a low nor a certified
high-quality firm B can make profits (the latter inequality is Assumption (A.4)).
Here there are two types of PBE in pure strategies. The first class sustains outcome
under pessimistic beliefs: No entry occurs. The second class of equilibria sustain
outcome under optimistic beliefs: Entry occurs only with high quality, and the
incumbent does not reject a high-quality entrant. In addition to the two classes of
PBE in pure strategies there may exist a PBE in mixed strategies in which firm B
chooses L with a particular positive probability, γ , and in which the incumbent
accepts a low-quality entrant with positive probability, ϕ, while it accepts with
probability 1 a high-quality entrant (see the Appendix). The set of PBE in mixed
strategies in which the entrant enters with probability 1 is either a singleton or
empty. It cannot contain more than one element because the belief that a firm
is of high quality is uniquely determined, and so are the mixed strategies of the
two firms. In Section A.1 of the Appendix, we characterize the candidate mixed-
strategy equilibrium in the case that reduced profit functions are linear in expected
quality of the entrant. We give conditions for this candidate to be an equilibrium.
If the condition that expected profits from entry are nonnegative fails then an
equilibrium in mixed strategies does not exist.
An equilibrium which survives the application of the stability criterion by
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) is called KM stable.
Proposition 3. Suppose πB(L) − e < 0. Generically, the set of PBE in pure
strategies which supports the outcome with no entry is not KM stable.
The proof is in Section A.2.
We thus have shown that, because a stable set always exists, if the profitabil-
ity condition for the candidate of a mixed strategy equilibrium is violated, the
unique stable set is that of pure strategies equilibria sustaining the outcome under
optimistic beliefs. If the profitability condition is strictly met, then also the mixed
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strategy equilibrium constitutes a stable set.18 Note that in both cases alliances
play a key role in determining the possibility of entry. Both types of equilibria
are destroyed if alliances are not allowed.
3. Extensions
In this section we briefly discuss some modifications and extensions of the model.
Action Space. Our moral hazard model allowed for 0-1 decisions by the firms
A and B which jointly determine whether or not an alliance is formed. If 0
corresponds to stay apart, then the action profiles (0, 1), (1, 0), and (0, 0) imply
no alliance. One could consider a different model in which only the action of
the established firm A matters; that is, no request by the entrant is required. The
argument about the signaling role of the incumbent’s action would remain valid.
This demonstrates that it is indeed the action of the established firm which solves
the asymmetric information problem for the entrant.
Adverse Selection. We obtained our results in an environment of moral hazard.
They similarly hold under adverse selection with exogenously given qualities of
an entrant. We distinguish two cases.
First, if πB(L) − e < 0, a correctly perceived low quality cannot survive in
the market. Then, there exist three classes of PBE: no entry, entry in which only
the high-quality firm enters, and pooling equilibria in which both types enter.
Depending on the parameters of the model (and Nature’s probability distribution
of types) the set of pooling equilibria is possibly empty. (For the characterization
of the set of pooling equilibria, see the discussion paper version of this paper,
Garella and Peitz (2005).) If there are no pooling equilibria with the formation
of an alliance we can apply a forward induction argument similar to the intuitive
criterion in order to select the set of PBE in which only the potential entrant of
high quality enters.
Second, if πB(L)− e ≥ 0, then Assumption (A.3) is violated and a correctly
perceived low quality can survive in the market. Then entry of low quality always
occurs. We then obtain the signaling role of alliance when consumers recognize
their informational role so that the incumbent accepts the entrant if Nature has
chosen H and rejects it if Nature has chosen L. In such an equilibrium the alliance
signals high quality of the entrant. If alliances were not allowed, a high-quality
18. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) prove the existence of stable sets. Since the set of equilibria
sustaining outcome-a (no-entry) is not stable, then the stable set is the one containing all equilibria
sustaining outcome-b if no other set of equilibria exist, namely if there is no mixed strategy equilib-
rium. When the mixed strategy equilibrium exists, we could not find any argument to prune it using
KM stability.
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firm would not find it worthwhile to enter, provided that it incurs sufficiently
greater fixed costs than a low-quality firm.
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection—Rejection along the Equilibrium Path.
An important concern with respect to the applicability of our model is that in
our model with moral hazard alliances are always observed along the equilibrium
path. By contrast, in case 2 with adverse selection they are not formed along the
equilibrium path. A natural extension can then be analyzed. Consider the case that
Nature determines whether or not a firm is capable to produce high quality. That is,
a capable firm B decides whether to produce high or low quality and an incapable
firm B is always of low quality. Assume furthermore that the cost e depends on
whether or not the firm has the capability or know-how. Denote eK the sunk cost
for a firm with know-how. Correspondingly, denote eL the sunk cost of firm B
that lacks the know-how. Suppose that πB(L) − eK < 0 but πB(L) − eL > 0.
Then under the assumptions of our model there exists an equilibrium in which
a capable firm B enters with high quality and an alliance is formed, whereas an
incapable firm B enters and is rejected by firm A. Consumers correctly infer firm
B’s quality from the fact that firms have formed an alliance.
4. Discussion
In our model the established firm uses its distribution network to distribute its com-
petitor’s product. Similarly, it may use its own brand to promote the competitor’s
product (either as a brand extension or through a co-branding agreement).
The empirical evidence on alliances is in line with the results of our analysis.
Recall that in our model the rationale for forming a marketing alliance is the ability
of the established firm to convince consumers that the unknown firm produces high
quality. This information problem faced by the entrant is likely to be a temporary
phenomenon. This suggests that such marketing alliances achieve this goal after
a short period of time so that they should be reorganized or possibly taken over
by the entrant. Hence, compared to other types of alliances we should expect that
marketing alliances are likely to be reorganized or terminated by a take-over. This
is indeed the finding of Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) in their analysis
of 227 alliances between competitors of which 50 are link alliances that focus on
marketing activities.19 Furthermore, they find that such marketing alliances are
19. In Tables 2 and 3 of Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) (henceforth DGM(2000)), the
authors present regression results for various types of alliances. The variable of interest for our
interpretation is called “Link alliances: Marketing” which is one of the explanatory variables for
the likelihood of reorganization or take-over of the alliance (or joint venture) in the regressions
corresponding to their Table 2 as well as to explain the likelihood of earlier reorganization or take-
over in the regressions corresponding to their Table 3. “Link alliances: Marketing” as an explanatory
variable for the likelihood of takeovers is significant at the 5% level. In the other three cases it is
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particularly likely to experience early take-over, which is compatible with our
explanation that information can be transmitted into the market.
Our explanation is in particular compatible with the following example. In
1978, the Japanese pharmaceutical company Takeda set up a joint venture with
the European chemical and (at that point) pharmaceutical company Hoechst to
market one of Takeda’s antibiotics (see Dussauge and Garrette 1999, p. 202).
Dussauge and Garrette then write
Hoechst . . . had little reason to help a new competitor enter a market where it
has a strong presence. Only the financial benefits derived from this could justify
forming the joint venture with Takeda. Hoechst invested initially very little in
the joint venture but, by contributing its marketing know-how, significantly
increased the value of the venture and cashed in on this value creation by
progressively selling out to Takeda. Hoechst’s rationale was that, sooner or
later, Takeda would enter the French market and it might as well reap some
profits from this entry.
In this example, Hoechst not only provided resources but also was “dealing
with local health authorities, local physicians and accessing local distribution
networks” (Dussauge and Garrette 1999, p. 202)—this includes Hoechst lending
its reputation to Takeda. 20
Another group of examples can be found in the biotech-pharmaceutical sec-
tor. Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullogh (2005) argue that inexperienced biotech
companies benefit from an alliance with a pharmaceutical company because it
sends a positive signal to prospective investors. Their empirical findings show
that biotech companies that sign a deal receive higher valuations from venture
capitalists as compared to those that do not sign deals. They also find that biotech
companies receive substantially discounted payments when signing their first
deals with a pharmaceutical company. This indicates that the latter appropriates
part of the gain generated by the alliance as a signal device.21
significant at the 1% level. Note that DGM (2000) offer the complementary explanation for their
results that learning effects are initially very important in link alliances. For additional empirical
results see Kogut (1991), who, however, does not distinguish between scale and link alliances.
20. In the case of presciption drugs, physicians in ambulatory health care and hospitals, as well
as hospital pharmacists, play the role of customers because they generate demand on behalf of the
patients. Pharmaceutical companies try to stimulate demand through the use of their own network
of medical representatives. Pharmaceutical companies that enter a market can either build up their
own network of medical representatives or try to enter through an existing network. Forming an
alliance with an established competitior has the advantage not only of avoiding the costly formation
of such a network but also of benefiting from the reputation an established company enjoys among
its customers (and opinion leaders). Note that reputation is important since the information provided
by clinical studies is noisy. We are grateful to Eberhard Wille for providing us with background
material on the pharmaceutical industry.
21. Such alliances fit in our framework in those cases where the pharmaceutical company produces
drugs that are in competition with the one that shall come out of the biotech project and asymmetric
838 Journal of the European Economic Association
Similarly, there are a number of examples in the automobile industry in which
the established firm provided market access to products by competing entrants.
In several cases this included the sharing of the distribution network, after-sales
services provided by the established firm, and in some cases even selling the new
product under the established firm’s brand name. The management literature refers
to such alliances as examples of link alliances where complementary resources
are used.22 As Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2004, p. 202) point out, “many
link alliances market one partner’s products in the other partner’s home market.”
For example, “the 1971 agreements between Chrysler and Mitsubishi, the 1983
NUMMI joint venture between General Motors and Toyota, and the agreements
linking General Motors to Isuzu in the 1970s and 1980s, are all examples of link
alliances in which a US firm marketed vehicles that its Japanese partner designed.”
The importance of alliances with established brands for the brand image of
a new brand has been widely recognized in the marketing literature (although
the role of competition has not). For instance, Samu, Krishnan, and Smith (1999,
p. 57) write “Although advertising alliances can benefit any firm, they are espe-
cially important for new brands or established brands entering new markets….
Advertising alliances can be used to achieve brand awareness and brand knowl-
edge goals more effectively by leveraging the strengths of established partners.”
Although the management literature on alliances has stressed the importance of
alliances for market access, it has largely overlooked the information role of such
alliances and their effect on competition. An exception is Dowling et al. (1996),
who find that alliances between competitors are more likely to be found among
larger firms in concentrated industries than among smaller firms in fragmented
industries. This is consistent with our theory that reputation sharing becomes
viable because of imperfect competition.
Although we have applied our analysis to alliances between competitors,
it applies to certain business practices other than alliances. We discuss prac-
tices concerning licensing standards, shared retailing space, and exclusionary
practices.23
information is also relevant for consumers. Our model can be modified to include asymmetric
information on the investor side.
22. Broadly speaking, following Hennart (1988) one can distinguish between scale and link
alliances. For example, in the automobile industry the former typically involve firms that jointly
design or manufacture a car or an important component such as an engine. More generally, many
research joint ventures are of this sort, where one firm typically handles design and production and
the other provides market access. Other useful references on alliances between competitors include
Dussauge and Garrette (1999), Dussauge, Garette, and Mitchell (2000), Garrette and Dussauge
(1995), and Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad (1989).
23. The analysis also applies to after-sales services that it provides to the customers of its rival’s
product. However, shared after-sales services can only be an effective signal if consumers are likely
to observe it before making their purchase. For instance, when the product is some specialized
machinery for industrial use, the practice of extending firm A’s services of a proprietary repair
network to firm B may be readily observed by all users.
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Suppose the incumbent owns rights about the use of a technical standard.
When allowed access to the standard the entrant makes a payment to the incum-
bent. Then, faced with entry, the incumbent may prefer to allow a high-quality
entrant access to the standard in return for a license fee, rather than to reject the
licensing request. A low-quality entrant will not be able to certify quality and may
not be able to survive, so that it will not be allowed to use the standard. Slightly
different from the main text, we would argue that maintaining separate standards
is costly, so that economies of scope would be present. If these economies are
not too strong, our previous argument carries over: In equilibrium, a high-quality
entrant obtains the right to use the incumbent’s standard whereas a low-quality
entrant would not. This serves as a signal to consumers that the entrant is of high
quality.
The establishment of shopping malls and trade centers, where sellers must
apply for the right to install their facilities, as well as fairs for goods with quality
uncertainty can also induce our selection mechanism. Here the idea is that the
acceptance or rejection of a particular seller in a shopping mall can work as a
signal.24 This relies on certain types of shops, for instance those selling men’s
or women’s wear, to be in competition with each other. Side payments can be
implicit in the different rental agreements, with low rents for well-established,
highly reputed brands. This is consistent with empirical work on rent differenti-
ation in shopping malls (see Pashigian and Gould 1998).25 Our paper provides
a theoretical argument for rent differentiation which is not based on demand
externalities but on asymmetric information of consumers.
Our paper also adds to the current debate on the role of manufacturer brands
and private brands. In recent years, Europe and the U.S. experienced an increas-
ing market share of private labels. In addition, in parts of Europe, in particular
in Germany and Spain, discounters have played an important role in retailing.
These discounters rely primarily on private labels. Margins for private brands
have been reported to be the retailers’ main profit drivers. Although this suggests
a decreasing role of manufacturer brands, they do play an important role in the
product offering of most retailers. Interestingly, in Europe, “hard” discounters
such as Lidl add brands by leading manufacturers and even Aldi, which used to
sell only private brands, has started to sell leading manufacturers’ brands. There
are multiple explanations about the role of manufacturers’ brands. The one related
to this paper is that private labels are often compared in quality to national brands.
Such a comparison may be seen as more credible if a leading manufacturer brand
24. Through so-called approval clauses a set of established shops control the selection of new shops
in a shopping mall. In the 1970s the FTC was concerned about the alleged anti-competitive effect of
these approval clauses (see, for instance, Tysons Corner, 85 FTC 970 (1975)).
25. The shopping mall in our set-up only plays the role of offering a selection of goods and thus
providing a signaling device. Demand externalities as they often arise in shopping malls are an
alternative explanation.
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is offered in the same shelf. The manufacturer may then decide not to lend its
reputation to the private label and simply not to offer its product if it considers the
quality comparison to be inappropriate.26 Although a careful analysis of retailing
markets, characterized by buyer power and imperfect competition between retail-
ers, is beyond the scope of this paper we have uncovered an economic mechanism
that can be applied to such an environment.
Exclusionary practices such as exclusive dealing, boycotts, and refusals to
deal fall much under the same category of actions as analyzed in this paper, pro-
vided they are based upon quality of the target. An illustration may be found in
the health insurance market in the US, where PPOs can be seen as contractual
organizations that select a group of providers of health services among all those
which are potentially available. Excluded providers could appeal against exclu-
sion by invoking the boycott or refusal to deal. A defense of PPOs against such
lawsuits is that participation to the group is granted according to quality standards.
Similarly, hospitals have the right to refuse access to providers of services.27
Membership to associations of producers sometimes also performs a role of
quality signaling and refused members can file against refusal decisions by the
associations. However, if it bases refusal on quality standards, the association is
not guilty of hurting competition. Rather, the existence of the association creates
an incentive to avoid the moral hazard trap for new producers, as the reputation
of members is lent to newcomers. For example, agricultural cooperatives, also
engaged in sales and marketing, might need an exclusion mechanism to defend
their reputation. Following our model, they do not obtain a competitive advantage
from refusing membership to a high-quality entrant, whereas they would do so in
the case of a low-quality entrant.28
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that an action by an established firm can reveal
information about the type of a competitor; information that can be a necessary
precondition of the latter’s survival. In a game where a firm with an unknown
brand has to pay certification costs to convey information about its own product
quality, the observable consequences of the rivals’ actions can be interpreted by
consumers.
26. Note that some retailers offer in addition to an alleged high-quality private brand that matches
the leading manufacturer’s quality also some basic quality. Our argument applies to the private brand
that claims to match the quality of the leading manufacturer’s brand.
27. The Federal Trade Commission has recognized that “in some circumstances, contracts where
a hospital grants a single firm the exclusive right to perform a particular medical service (e.g.,
anesthesia) at the hospital can be procompetitive” (Lerner 1984, p. 213).
28. A concrete example is the VdP, an association of German quality wine producers, in which
long-established quality wine producers and newcomers coexist.
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The idea that an established firm’s action reveals to consumers information
about another firm could also have been made precise using an argument available
in the context of reputation lending mechanisms (for instance in Biglaiser and
Friedman 1994; Chu and Chu 1994). Reputation lending hinges upon what we
have called the reputation story: Consumers understand that there is a long-term
cost to an established firm, or agent, of loosing its reputation after cheating about
the value of a different unknown (new) brand. This cost must be higher than the
short-term gain from providing respectability to low-quality firms. Note that the
essence of such an argument can apply to different types of interaction between
firms and purely relies on consumers punishing the established firm if their beliefs
are not confirmed. However, it is questionable whether established firms indeed
suffer such a reputation loss.
In our model, the established firm can never lose its reputation. By contrast,
we present an argument that relies on product market competition between firms.
The established firm, we contend, has an incentive to make consumers believe
that the firm with an unknown brand is of low quality. To this end, it can reject
to form an alliance with a low-quality entrant to reveal this quality to consumers
and improve its relative attractiveness in the eyes of consumers. Provided that a
high-quality rival can defend itself by certifying its quality, the rejection of such
a rival is not beneficial for the established firm. Even when a firm with certified
high quality is not profitable ex ante, the possibility of certification allows a high-
quality firm to avoid the negative reaction of consumers and thus eliminates the
incumbent’s incentive to reject high quality. In the extreme, if recognized high
quality is a precondition for positive net profits, market structure is changed as
the number of competitors is increased compared to an environment in which
alliances between competitors are not allowed.
Antitrust authorities have been concerned of the potential anticompetitive
consequences of alliances.29 However, they have recognized that such alliances
can have efficiency-enhancing and pro-competitive effects. Our paper adds to this
debate by pointing out a pro-competitive effect due to information asymmetries
between firms and consumers. As far as we are aware, this is an aspect that has
so far been overlooked.
It would be interesting to extend our formal argument to markets with more
than one established firm. Such an extension is, in general, not trivial because it
appears that with several established firms an entrant can easily bribe an estab-
lished firm into an alliance. However, playing one established firm off against
another does not necessarily work in a segmented, differentiated product market.
In such a market possibly only one of the established is a suitable partner because
it offers market access to the most relevant consumer segment. Then our argument
about the signaling role of alliances still applies.
29. See, for example, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice (2000).
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Appendix: PBE in Mixed Strategies and Stability
We consider consumer beliefs with Prob{H |(N, 2)} ∈ (0, 1). If (N, 2) obtains
in PBE with positive probability, beliefs have to be confirmed. Hence, in any
PBE with such beliefs the entrant must be indifferent between choosing H or
L. Denote the probability that an entrant who is part of an alliance and does not
certify is of high quality by b, i.e. b = Prob{H |(N, 2)}. Because a high-quality
entrant always certifies when rejected by the incumbent, the incumbent always
accepts to form an alliance when facing H .
In general, the profits of the firms depend on b in a way which is not linear: πA
will not be a linear combination of πA(L) and πA(H). Similarly, πB will not be a
linear combination of πB(L) and πB(H). This said, the calculations for a mixed
strategy equilibrium can always be done in specific examples where consumers’
utility functions, the demand functions, and firms’ costs are completely specified.
In general there is no presumption that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
A.1. Characterization of Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
We shall proceed under the simplifying assumption that expected profits are linear
combination of the full information profits for both firms. This case only serves
for illustrative purposes.30 Denote by ϕ the probability of accepting an entrant of
type L in the mixed strategy adopted by the incumbent. When faced with L the
incumbent’s expected profits as a function of b are
EπA = ϕ(bπA(H) + (1 − b)πA(L) + f ) + (1 − ϕ)πA(L).
For a PBE with mixed strategies to exist it must be ϕ ∈ (0, 1) because if ϕ = 0,
the entrant does not have an interest to produce L whereas if ϕ = 1 the entrant
does not have an interest in producing H . For ϕ to be in (0, 1), the incumbent must
be indifferent between accepting and rejecting an entrant of type L. This implies
bπA(H) + (1 − b)πA(L) + f = πA(L). This equation uniquely determines b:
b = f
πA(L) − πA(H) (A.1)
Note that Assumption A(1+) implies that b < 1. At stage 1 the entrant has to
choose quality. In order to confirm beliefs, the entrant must be indifferent between
H and L. If she chooses H her profits are
bπB(H) + (1 − b)πB(L) − f − (1 − b)h − e
30. Linearity is indeed satisfied if prices are fixed. Also, in a two-sided market context in which
“consumers” are not charged for the service but revenues are generated on the other side depending
on the number of consumers, we can give specifications such that linearity would be satisfied.
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because an alliance is always formed and with probability 1 − b the entrant is
wrongly perceived to be of low quality. If instead she chooses L then she obtains
ϕ[bπB(H) + bh + (1 − b)πB(L) − f ] + (1 − ϕ)πB(L) − e.
For the entrant to be indifferent these two expressions must be equal. This reduces
to
1 − ϕ = h
b[h + πB(H) − πB(L)] − f . (A.2)
Note that when 1 − ϕ > 1 the mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist because
the incumbent rejects a low-quality entrant with probability equal to 1. This
necessarily happens when (1 − b)(h + f ) > b[πB(H) − πB(L) − f ] which is
satisfied for the payment f sufficiently small because b = f/(πA(L)−πA(H)).
Suppose 1 − ϕ > 1. Then a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in the
linear specification if the entrant makes positive profits given the calculated
probabilities, that is, if
f
πA(L) − πA(H)πB(H) +
(
1 − f
πA(L) − πA(H)
)
(πB(L) − h) − e − f > 0.
Clearly, this inequality is violated if f is sufficiently small relative to πA(L) −
πA(H).
In a mixed strategy equilibrium equations (A.1) and (A.2) determine b and
ϕ. Then, let γ denote the probability that the entrant choose L. A candidate for a
quasi-separating PBE has posterior beliefsb satisfying 1−b = ϕγ/[(1−γ )+ϕγ ].
This determines γ = (1 − b)/(1 − b + bϕ).
A.2. Stability—Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Let E0 denote the set of all Bayesian equilibria sustaining the outcome with no
entry. When a mixed strategy equilibrium exists and generates positive profits for
the entrant the corresponding equilibrium set and the equilibrium set sustaining
no-entry, E0, are disconnected. Only when a mixed strategy equilibrium exists
and generates zero profits for the entrant the corresponding equilibrium set and the
equilibrium set sustaining no-entry are connected. The equilibrium set sustaining
the outcome under optimistic beliefs is always disconnected.
(ii) Assume that no-entry is a strong best reply for the entrant given the
opponent’s strategies and the consumers’ beliefs. No entry gives zero profits.
Then any equilibrium in E0 must be formed by beliefs such that b(N, 1) < 1
to guarantee that an entrant of low quality gets strictly negative expected profits.
(Indeed, if one had b(N, 1) = 1 then a low-quality entrant would get πB(H)−e+
h > 0: from Assumption A(3), πB(H) − e > 0 because under full information
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a high-quality firm would enter.) Let πB(b) denote expected profits from entry
with low quality (if expected profits are linear combinations then one can write
πB(b) = b(πB(H) − e − f ) + (1 − b)(πB(L) − e)). Because no entry is an
entrant’s strong best reply for the system of belief under consideration, strategy
L is not a weak best reply.
A stable set contains all KM stable sets of the game obtained after deletion of
any one strategy that is not a weak best reply against the strategy profile adopted by
the other players (Proposition 6 in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). Then, consider
the game G′ that is the original game except for the deletion of L at the first
stage. Clearly, the stable equilibrium sets of this game are such that H is chosen
at stage 1, the incumbent accepts the entrant, and consumers buy according to
the belief that both qualities are H . The intersection between the set of stable
equilibria of G′ and E0 is empty and therefore the set E0 cannot contain the
stable sets of G′, so that it is not a stable set of the original game.
(iii) Assume now that no-entry is not a strong but is a weak best reply at the
equilibrium under consideration. Then for L to be a weak best reply one should
have that the entrant be indifferent between no-entry and L (and H ) in order
for the considered equilibrium to belong to E0. This means that the incumbent
will randomize over accepting and rejecting a low-quality entrant. Hence we are
back to our unique mixed strategy equilibrium, with the particular parameter
constellation which gives zero expected profits for the entrant. Otherwise the
no-entry choice cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Profits equal to zero in the
mixed strategy equilibrium corresponds to a set of zero measure in the space of
admissible parameter values.
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